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Judgment Proofing The Profession
POONAM PURI*
In the law of business organizations, individuals have generally been
unrestrained in choosing which legal form they will use to carry on productive
endeavors. Professionals, however, have not been afforded such freedom. They
have found themselves prohibited by their self-regulatory bodies from practicing
their profession in a corporate form. As a result, members of professions have
practiced either as sole practitioners or in partnership with other members of the
same profession. Professionals practicing in partnership expose themselves to
personal liability for the obligations of the partnership and wrongdoing by their
partners. This Article analyzes the rise of limited liability partnerships ("LLPs"),
a newly created form of business association that shields innocent partners from
personal liability for the negligence of their partners, in the United States and
Canada. Professor Puri argues that the development of LLPs has significant
implications for the legal profession. First, the private benefits conferred upon
lawyers by LLPs are at the expense of consumers of legal services, particularly
unsophisticated consumers. Second, the benefits of LLPs will accrue dispropor-
tionately to partners in large law firms because the judiciary is more likely to
pierce the LLP veil in the context of small law firms organized as LLPs, thereby
creating a further divide between the two "hemispheres" of lawyers. Third, LLPs
represent another step in the commercialization of the legal profession, suggest-
ing that we ought to reflect on how to distinguish between the practice of law and
the carrying on of other businesses, and re-evaluate the benefits associated with
being members of a profession.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the law of business organizations, individuals have generally been
unrestrained in choosing which legal form they will use to carry on productive
* Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Fulbright
Scholar, Conell Law School (2000-2001). I owe thanks to Ian Ayres, Kevin Davis, Martha Fineman, Mitu
Gulati, Peter Hogg, Doug Kysar, Lome Sossin, John McCamus, Lisa Philipps, Ray Solomon, Elian Temer,
Michael Trebilcock, Toni Williams, and Charles Wolfram for helpful comments and discussions. Anjali Banka,
Cathy Costa and Elizabeth Morgan provided excellent research assistance. This article was presented at the
Cornell Law School's Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop entitled Feminism, Corporations and Capitalism:
Policy and Protest. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the American Law and Society Association's
Annual Meeting, the Canadian Law and Economics Association's Annual Meeting, and the Canadian Law and
Society Association's Annual Meeting. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and
the Canadian Foundation for Legal Research provided generous funding for this project.
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endeavors. Professionals, however, have not been afforded such freedom. They
have found themselves prohibited by their self-regulatory bodies from practicing
their profession using a corporate form.' As a result, members of professions
have practiced either as sole practitioners or in partnership with other members of
the same profession. Professionals practicing in partnership expose themselves to
personal liability for the obligations of the partnership and any wrongdoing by
their partners.2
In the spring of 1998, Ontario became the first province in Canada to allow
professionals to form limited liability partnerships ("LLPs"),3 a newly created
form of business association.4 Almost every state in the United States has enacted
LLP legislation,5 and LLP legislation has also recently been enacted in England.6
The distinguishing feature of LLPs is that innocent partners are shielded from
personal liability for the negligence of their partners.7
This Article analyzes the development of limited liability partnerships for the
legal profession. As recently as the late 1970s, accountants and lawyers had very
little interest in gaining the advantages of limited liability.8 The legal profession's
successful lobbying for LLPs was instigated by the changes in law firm
organization and structure over the last several decades which make it difficult
and inefficient for partners to monitor each other's activities as well as an
increased fear by lawyers of burgeoning liability.9
The development of LLPs has several implications for the legal profession.
First, the private benefits conferred upon lawyers by LLPs are at the expense of
consumers of legal services, particularly unsophisticated consumers. While
limited liability in the law firm may be justified on the basis of allocative
efficiency, it has a non-negligible distributional impact. Second, the benefits of
limited liability will accrue disproportionately to partners in large law firms
because the judiciary is more likely to pierce the LLP veil in the context of
smaller law firms organized as LLPs, thereby further separating the two
1. See J. Robert S. Prichard, Incorporation by Lawyers, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST:
REGULATING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 303 (Robert G. Evans & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 1982).
2. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY & DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW ch.2 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
3. Partnership Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990), amended by ch. 2,1998 S.O.(Can.).The 1998 Amendment to the
Partnership Act created LLPs.
4. The province of Alberta also recently passed LLP legislation, and other provinces are actively considering
implementation of similar legislation. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
5. All 50 states have modified their partnership statutes to permit general partnerships to register as LLPs.
See J. William Callsion & Allan W. Vestal, "They've Created a Lamb with Mandibles of Death": Secrecy,
Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Firms, 76 IND. L.J. 271, 313 n.2 (2001).
6. See Judith Freedman and Vanessa Finch, Have Accountants Sewn up the Deep Pockets Debate?, 1997 J.
Bus. L. 387.
7. See infra Part I.D.
8. Prichard, supra note 1, at 303.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
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"hemispheres" of lawyers.' ° Third, LLPs represent another step in the commer-
cialization of the practice of law, suggesting that we ought to re-evaluate the
benefits associated with being members of a profession.
Part II of this Article explores the different methods used by lawyers to limit
their liability. Part III conducts a policy analysis of limited liability in the law
firm. Part IV provides an analysis of the legislative process through which LLP
legislation was enacted in Ontario. Part V concludes that the private benefits
conferred upon lawyers by LLPs are at the expense of consumers of legal
services, particularly unsophisticated consumers.
H. TECHNIQUES USED By LAWYERS To LIMIT LIABILITY
In attempts to minimize the impact of partnership principles that impose
unlimited personal liability on innocent partners in a partnership for the
negligence of their co-partners, lawyers who practice in partnership with other
lawyers have utilized techniques, such as the sheltering of assets and the
formation of management corporations in order to avoid these legal rules. More
recently, lawyers have lobbied to encourage the legislative creation of limited
liability entities such as professional corporations ("PCs") and LLPs. Part II sets
out and evaluates the effectiveness of these techniques of limiting liability.
A. SHELTERING PERSONAL ASSETS
The simplest way for lawyers practicing in a partnership to avoid personal
liability in the event that a successful lawsuit has been brought against one of
their partners is to shelter their personal assets by ensuring that title to those
assets is in the name of a trusted third party, such as a spouse or a child."
10. Heinz & Laumann have argued that there are two "hemispheres" of the legal profession - a corporate
client hemisphere and a personal client hemisphere. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the
Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REv. 953 (2000) (extending the 'hemisphere'
paradigm to the Ontario legal market); John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findings from a
Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735 (1999) (updating the 1982 study); John P. Heinz, Edward 0.
Laumann et al., The Constituencies of Elite Urban Lawyers, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 441 (1997) (observing
empirically characteristics of law fins in U.S. urban centers); Edward 0. Laumann et al., Washington Lawyers
and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1985) (exploring the
'hemispheres' in Washington).
11. See generally on judgment proofing K.E. Davis, Vicarious Liability, Judgment Proofing and Non-Profits,
50 U. TORONTO L.J. 407 (2000); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Death of Liability]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz,
52 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1999)[hereinafter LoPucki, A Reply to Professor Schwarcz]; Steven L. Schwarcz,
Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder 52 STAN. L. REv. 77 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of
Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1998) [hereinafter LoPucki, Judgment Proofing]; Lynn M. LoPucki,
Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998)[hereinafter LoPucki, Rejoinder]; James L.
White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's 'The Death of Liability,' 107 YALE L.J.
1363 (1998).
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Typically, the successful plaintiff will first seek to recover from the partnership's
insurer, and then from the assets of the partnership. If any remaining amount is
owed, the plaintiff will look to the personal assets of each of the partners in the
law firm; however, if each of the partners has successfully sheltered his or her
personal assets, there will be few significant assets that can be seized to satisfy
the plaintiff's judgment.
The benefit of this technique is that it is simple and involves minimal
transaction costs. As long as it is engaged in sufficiently in advance of any lawsuit
and is done without an intent to defraud creditors, it is unlikely that a successful
plaintiff would be able to have the sheltering transaction set aside and thus gain
access to the personal assets of the partnership's partners. 12 This technique is
culturally accepted and widespread, not only in professional practice but also in
other areas of productive activity where liability may be an issue. 13 However,
there is an obvious and substantial risk associated with using this technique: the
third party who holds title to the property may not return it on demand, and it may
be difficult to convince a court to assist in such a matter, since the lawyer would
not be coming to the court with clean hands. As well, the recent rise of the
two-professional household in which both members face unlimited personal
liability limits the applicability of this technique, because holding title to assets in
each other's names may not significantly reduce overall exposure to liability.
Perhaps this fact partially accounts for the relatively recent lobbying for limited
liability entities such as the LLP.
B. MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONS
The use of a management corporation is another technique used by lawyers
practicing in a partnership to minimize the effects of unlimited personal
liability.' 4 Despite its name, the basic feature of this structure is a requirement
that the law firm carry on its activities as a partnership, as required by the
jurisdiction's laws. A management company is incorporated, and voting shares
are issued to the partners in the law firm, and non-voting shares may be issued to
their spouses, children, or family trusts. The board of directors of the manage-
ment corporation is comprised of the partners of the law firm.' 5
12. See generally Fraudulent Conveyances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.29.
13. See Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 351 (1979).
14. See generally L.R. Hayward, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH.
L. REv. 403 (1996); K.L. Levine, Obtaining 501(C)(3) Status for Professional Medical Corporations, 2 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 231 (1998); S. Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call For Action, 7 HEALTH
MATRIX 241 (1997).
15. The management company holds title to a substantial portion of the assets of the professional enterprise,
including the long-term lease, the office furniture, and the computer hardware and software. The management
company hires the non-lawyer employees such as secretaries, librarians, receptionists and computer support
staff.
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The relationship between the management corporation and the law partnership
is purely contractual. The management corporation has a set of long-term
contractual obligations with the law partnership. The management corporation
sub-leases the premises, leases assets such as computer hardware and software,
and supplies the law partnership with support staff in exchange for periodic
payments for the provision of such services.
The law partnership hires the law associates and bills work to clients. The
revenue is disbursed from the law partnership in a number of ways. A portion of
the revenues is paid out to the professional employees (i.e., associates in the law
firm) in the form of salaries. A substantial portion of the revenue is paid out to the
management corporation in the form of compensation for use of office space, use
of assets and services rendered. Partners draw any remaining profits in the law
partnership on a periodic basis. The management corporation receives its
revenues, and after the payment of its expenses, distributes dividends to the
shareholders on a frequent basis.
Two key benefits result from this structure. First, significant tax benefits may
accrue to partners because they can split their incomes with spouses and children.
Second and more important, the assets of the enterprise that remain in the
management corporation are separated from the risk-generating aspects (e.g.,
negligence claims) of the enterprise in the law partnership. 16 Thus, if a claim is
successfully made against the partnership for negligent work, there will be very
few partnership assets to satisfy the claim, because the organization's most
significant assets are shielded from recovery within the management corpora-
tion. 7
Despite its benefits, use of the management corporation involves high
transaction costs in setting up and maintaining the organizational structure.
Additionally, the limitations of liability may not be airtight. Drawing an analogy
to piercing the corporate veil in the context of parent-subsidiary corporations, a
court could pierce the management corporation's limited liability veil and allow
the partnership's creditors to access the assets held by the corporation in an
appropriate case.
18
16. See LoPucki, A Rejoinder, supra note 11 at 1416-18; LoPucki, A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, supra note
11 at 51-63; LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, supra note 11 at 147; White, supra note 11
at 1366.
17. Id.
18. For a general discussion of piercing the corporate veil, see Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379
(1999); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Thompson, Unpacking
Limited Liability].
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C. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
In the United States, lawyers and other professionals successfully lobbied state
legislatures in the 1960s for the creation of a new form of business association
known as the professional corporation.19 With the exception of the province of
Alberta, the professional corporation as a form of business organization does not
exist in Canada.2 ° In a professional corporation jurisdiction, law firms that are
carried on as partnerships can be converted into professional corporations,
thereby gaining significant tax advantages and possibly limitations of liability.
However, relatively few law firms in the United States have converted to
professional corporations. Of the 250 largest firms in the United States, only
nineteen are professional corporations. 2' Fewer than 20 percent of New York
City-based law firms listed in Martindale-Hubbell are professional corpora-
tions.22
There are at least five explanations for the rare use of this form of business
association. First, the limitations of liability are not airtight as lawyers had
hoped.23 Second, the tax advantages of the professional corporation over time
have become negligible. 24 Third, there are significant up-front transaction costs
associated with converting from a partnership to a corporation because of the
fundamental differences in governance structure.25 The use of the partnership
form of business association does not require a written agreement (although most
large law firms do have detailed partnership agreements), while certain docu-
ments must be created and filed to form a professional corporation. Fourth, there
are continuing transaction costs associated with carrying on a practice using a
professional corporation in comparison to a partnership. While a partnership
involves no reporting requirements, use of a corporate form involves periodic
filing and reporting requirements. Finally, lawyers are reluctant to change their
19. G.M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 Mo. L. REv. 151 (2000); H.B. Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27
FORDHAM L. REv. 353 (1958); Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 776 (1962).
20. See Alberta Law Reform Institute, Limited Liability Partnerships: Final Report, 77 at 31-36 (1999)
(discussing the creation of professional corporations in Alberta); D.J. Stratton & D.L. Hughes, Case Comment:
Canada (Attorney General) v. Roger M. Bourbonnais Professional Corporation, 35 ALBERTA L. REv. 777,
781-82 (1997) (suggesting that the main reason for use of professional corporations in Alberta was taxation and
not a concern about unlimited liability).
21. SUSAN SAMUELSON, LAW FiRM MANAGEMENT: A BUSINESS APPROACH § 2.24 (1994).
22. See Martindale-Hubbell, at http://www.martindale.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
23. The shareholders of a professional corporation generally have unlimited liability for the obligations of
the business.
24. Ronald J. Gilson, Unlimited Liability and Law Firm Organization: Tax Factors and the Direction of
Causation, 2 J. POL. ECON. 420, 425 n.10 (1991).
25. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Changing Statutory Forms, 1 J. SMALL & EMERG. Bus. L. 11 (1997);
Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, Linking Statutory
Forms, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 187-200 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held
Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369 (1995).
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organizational structure from that of a partnership to a corporation for psychologi-
cal reasons. Lawyers are reluctant to see their partners became their co-
shareholders. "Making shareholder" does not appear to have the same significance
as "making partner." There is a sharp symbolic difference between a partnership
and a corporation. While the partnership connotes collegiality and teamwork, the
corporation connotes pure profit motive, which is an image that lawyers as
professionals are reluctant to openly embrace.
D. LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
Most recently, lawyers have lobbied successfully to limit their liability through
the adoption of LLP legislation. LLP legislation was first enacted in Texas in
1991 as a result of intense lobbying by the legal profession that was faced with
lawsuits arising from the savings and loan crisis. 2 6 Other states followed with
similar legislation, with the result that almost all states now have some form of
LLP legislation.27 In 1998, Ontario became the first province in Canada to pass
LLP legislation. 8 In 1999, Alberta became the second province and other
provinces are seriously considering its implementation. 29 England has also
adopted a form of LLP legislation.3 °
The first wave of LLP statutes enacted in the United States shielded innocent
partners from personal liability resulting from the negligence of their partners.31
However, partners remained personally liable for their own negligence as well as
for the negligence of anyone under their supervision or control.3 2 Additionally,
all partners in the partnership remained personally liable for liabilities arising
from contractual breaches and claims based on theories other than negligence.33
Texas and Delaware were the first states to enact statutes with these limitations of
liability.3
4
The second wave of LLP statutes created much broader liability shields by
granting, in addition to the "innocent partner" liability shield described above,
full protection from other liabilities.35 Thus, partners in a second wave LLP are
no longer personally liable when their partnership, for example, breaches an
improvident lease. Minnesota was the first state to enact this form of LLP
26. For a history of the enactment of LLP legislation, see Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1066-74 (1995).
27. See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr (2000).
28. See Partnership Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990), amended by ch. 2, 1998 S.O.(Can.).
29. See Partnership Act, R.S.A., ch. P-2, §79 (1980) amended by S.A., ch. 27, § 8 1999 (Can.).
30. See Finch & Freedman, supra note 6, at 387.
31. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 22.
32. Id. at 23.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Id.
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statute.36
The LLP legislation passed in Ontario follows the first wave of LLP statutes
passed in the United States. In Ontario, innocent partners are shielded from debts
or obligations arising out of "negligent acts or omissions" of their partners.37
Partners still remain personally liable for their own negligence as well as the
negligence of anyone under their "direct supervision or control. 3 8 The formal
requirements to convert from a general partnership to an LLP are minimal. The
law firm must register the LLP under the Ontario Business Names Act and with
the Law Society of Upper Canada ("Law Society"), the self-regulatory body for
lawyers in Ontario. 39 Under Ontario's LLP legislation, the only form of
mandatory notice to third parties is a requirement that the firm include the letters
LLP after the firm's name.40 The Law Society has imposed an additional
requirement that existing clients must also be sent a letter advising them of the
change to an LLP, but a law firm can satisfy this requirement by placing an
advertisement in a local newspaper.4 ' A final requirement is that a law firm
converting to an LLP must comply with minimum mandatory insurance
requirements set out by the Law Society.
42
III. POLICY ANALYSIS OF LIMITED LIABILITY IN THE LAW FIRM
Limited liability for shareholders is considered a fundamental characteristic of
the corporation. It is deeply embedded in our legal and social culture.43 However,
limited liability did not always co-exist with the corporate form of business
association. 44 It was introduced into the corporate form in England in the
nineteenth century with much debate and controversy. 45 Michael Smart has noted
that limited liability did not spread rapidly in England, in part because companies
that opted for it were signaling to the market that they were engaged in high-risk
activities.46 In North America, American Express was until as recently as the
36. Id.
37. See Partnership Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990) amended by S.O., ch.2, § 10(2) 1998 (Can.).
38. Id. § 10(3).
39. See id. §§ 44.2 and 44.3(1).
40. See id. § 44.3(3).
41. Law Society of Upper Canada Bylaw 26, §§ 2(1) and 2(2).
42. See Partnership Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990) (Ont.), as amended by S.O., c.2, §44.2(b). Law Society of
Upper Canada Bylaw 26, § 1 establishes the minimum insurance required by a law firm practicing as an LLP to
be "the coverage now maintained individually by each member who is a partner of the firm. This is currently in
the amount of $1,000,000 per member." Note that minimum mandatory liability insurance is not a requirement
for the practice of law in most American jurisdictions. See infra Part IlI.C.3.
43. See LoPucki, A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 4.
44. See, e.g., Paul Halpem et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U.
TORONTo L.J. 117 (1980); Teresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the
Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1387 (1992).
45. Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 615 (1997).
46. Michael Smart, University of Toronto Faculty of Law Working Paper (1996) (on file with author).
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mid-1950s a publicly traded corporation with unlimited liability for its share-
holders. 47 This part of the Article analyzes the policy arguments in favor of
limited liability in the law firm, implications for consumers and other third
parties, and effects on internal dynamics within the law firm.
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF LIMITED LIABILITY IN THE LAW FIRM
1. MONITORING
A key argument in favor of limited liability in the law firm is that traditional
general (i.e., unlimited) partnerships unfairly impose personal liability on
innocent partners who had no power to prevent any wrongdoing, especially given
the organizational changes that have taken place in law firms over the last several
decades.
Four organizational changes, in particular, play into the inability to monitor
argument. First, law firms have experienced tremendous growth in recent years.
The exponential growth of large, elite law firms has been well documented. 48 The
argument is that partners in a several-hundred-lawyer firm are unable to
effectively monitor their partners' work. The globalization of law practice, which
has also been well documented, is another factor at play.49 The argument is that a
partner in the New York office of a law firm with a global presence cannot
effectively monitor a partner in the Hong Kong office and therefore ought not to
be personally liable for his or her negligence. An argument along a similar vein
relates to the increased specialization in the practice of law. 50 It is unfair, for
47. See P.Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case ofAmerican
Express, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 63 (1995).
48. See generally, MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE
LAW FIRM (1988); Ronald J. Daniels, Growing Pains: The Hows and Whys of Law Firm Expansion, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 147 (1993); Ronald J. Daniels, The Law Firm as an Efficient Community, 37 McGILL L.J. 801
(1992); see also L.E. Gasey, Big Firms' Hiring Surges as Business Booms, CHI. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 40-41
(stating that "25 of Chicago's 26 largest firms show[ed] gains of from 14 to 19 percent in their Chicago and
suburban offices"); David Marcus, Ain't No Time for the Summertime Blues, AM. LAW., June 1998, at 17-18
(stating that six of the ten highest-grossing U.S. firms hired their largest classes of summer associates ever in
1998).
49. See also Carlyn Kolker & A.J. Noble, A World of Lawyers, Am. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 53-54 (projecting
that protocols on interjurisdictional law firms developed by the Federation of Law Societies may be the first step
in permitting the globalization of the Canadian legal market); Aric Press, We're all Connected, AM. LAW., Nov.
1998, at 6-8 (discussing efforts under way to increase international law teaching, leading to a so-called "golden
era"); The Legal Profession: The World Is Their Oyster, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 21, 1998, at C3 (stating that
Canadian firms are increasingly becoming globalized in order to meet their client needs); J. Mitchell, The Firm,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 27, 1997, at Al (stating that the legal profession is headed towards the
establishment of "a small clutch of mega-firms [that] hog the transnational business").
50. New Practice Areas Are Important to Law Firm Growth, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1990, at 18 ("The only
way law firms can protect their market share is by specializing."); M. France, It's Hot, Tax is Not, in Mid-90s
Practice, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 1996, at Al (noting that while the areas of specialization change to meet the
demands of clients, specialization is necessary for large firms); A. Ward, Griping Isn't Good Strategy:
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example, to impose liability on a partner in a law firm who practices tax law for
the negligence of a partner who practices intellectual property law, since the tax
partner cannot effectively monitor the intellectual property partner. Supporters of
LLP legislation argue that while general partnership liability may have been
suitable in an era when lawyers were generalists, they are no longer appropriate
in the age of specialization. A fourth factor playing into the monitoring argument
relates to the increased interest in multi-disciplinary firms. 51 An innocent partner
from one professional discipline should not be held personally liable for the
negligence of a partner belonging to another professional discipline. In particular,
a key concern relates to the possibility that innocent law partners may be held
liable for the negligence of their potential auditing partners, who face much
higher risks of liability.
The arguments presented in favor of LLPs all center around the difficulty of
monitoring one's partners, given the organizational changes that have taken place
in big law firms. These changes, however, are the consequences of voluntary
choices made by partners in law firms to organize within the firm rather than
across markets. 52 As Professor Charles Wolfram put it, these are "self-inflicted
wounds."5 3 Instead of contracting out work to contract lawyers, partners in law
firms decided it was more efficient to expand internally by hiring more attorneys.
Instead of contracting out work to foreign law firms when doing international
work, partners in law firms decided it was more efficient (for goodwill or quality
control reasons) to set up their own branch offices in foreign cities. Similarly,
rather than remaining generalists, partners in law firms decided to take advantage
of the efficiencies of specialization. These choices brought with them tremendous
advantages but also come with certain costs. It is difficult to accept the argument
that lawyers should be allowed to reap the tremendous benefits while avoiding
the costs that are associated with these changes in law firm organization and
structure.
Specialization, Organization are Best Weapons Against Accounting Firms, TEx. LAW., Feb. 1999, at 19
(observing that law firms must be more specialized in order to compete with accounting firms); Tom
Schoenberg, How to Grow by Acquisition, LEGAL TIMES, June 29, 1998, at S38-39 (reporting that one of
Chicago's top law firms is succeeding because it strategically recruited for highly specialized practice areas)
51. See ABA Final Report to the House of Delegates on Multi-Disciplinary Firms (August 1999); The
"Futures" Task Force - Final Report of the Working Group on Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships, Law Society of
Upper Canada (Sept. 25, 1998), at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/MDPOct98.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2001);
see also John Quinn, Multidisciplinary Legal Services and Preventive Regulation, in LAwYERS AND THE
CONSUMER INTEREST: REGULATING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 1, at 329; Michael Trebilcock
& Lisa Csorgo, Multi-Disciplinary Professional Practices: A Consumer Welfare Perspective (September 25,
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
52. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (2000); Daniels, The Law Firm as an Efficient Community, supra note 48, at 813.
53. Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP
Campaign, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 359, 367 (1998).
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2. LIABILITY CRISIS
Proponents of limited liability in the law firm also argue that lawyers are facing
a liability crisis, particularly because plaintiffs have an incentive to sue those with
significant assets. While this phenomenon was manifest in the suits brought
against law firms in relation to the savings and loan crisis in the United States,54 it
cannot be said that a similar trend has been witnessed in Canada. The successful
lobbying for legislation creating LLPs in Canada may be seen as a pre-emptive
strike by the legal profession to avoid burgeoning liability.
The concern about a liability crisis seems to emanate from the fact that
plaintiffs, knowing that defendants will be held jointly and severally liable for
any loss, will name as many defendants as possible, and particularly those with
"deep pockets." Under a rule of joint and several liability, lawyers are exposed to
significant personal liability when practicing in law firms organized as general
partnerships even if their law firm's role in a particular transaction is minimal
relative to the involvement of other defendants. If this characterization were
correct, then a more finely tuned legislative response than LLPs would be to
replace the rule of joint and several liability among defendants with a rule of
proportionate liability.
55
3. RAISING CAPITAL FROM PASSIVE INVESTORS
A general argument in favor of limited liability is that it facilitates the raising
of capital and the efficient functioning of public capital markets.56 Prospective
investors are more likely to invest when their exposure to liability is limited to
their capital investment in the business. However, law firms have historically not
been capital-intensive enterprises; they have, and continue to be, labor intensive.
The rise of multi-disciplinary firms may create a greater need for capital, and it
may be necessary for law firms to attract outside capital from passive investors.5 7
A rule of unlimited liability would result in a non-uniform share price: the value
of each investor's shares would be based on, among other things, their wealth as
well as the wealth of other investors,5 8 whereas a rule of limited liability would
54. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1066-74 (1997).
55. Auditors in Canada are currently lobbying for replacement of the rule ofjoint and several liability with a
rule of proportionate liability. See Canada, Legislative Assembly, Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce (1998).
56. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 40-62 (Harvard University Press
1991).
57. See generally E.S. Adams & J.H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal For Non-Lawyer
Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1998).
58. See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 56, at 40-62.
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allow for a uniform share price and a more liquid trading market.59
4. FAIRNESS
A fourth argument in favor of limited liability for partners practicing in law
firms relates to the principle of fairness. It is simply unfair for lawyers to be
subject to unlimited personal liability but shareholders, managers and employees
of businesses organized as corporations to have the benefit of limited liability. For
example, most of a law firm's business clients are organized as corporations as
are many of a law firm's counterparts and competitors (such as investment banks
and venture capitalists).60 The shareholders, managers and employees of such
businesses have the advantage of limited personal liability for any liabilities or
obligations of the corporation. On the issue of monitoring, an analogy can be
drawn between partners in a large law firm and corporate officers and directors
who hold shares in the corporations they manage. Corporate managers who are
often minority shareholders do not expose themselves or other managers to
personal liability when they make decisions on behalf of the corporation; when
their actions result in injury or harm to third parties, generally speaking, only the
corporation is liable.6 t
The rule requiring lawyers to practice either as sole-practitioners or in a
general partnership with other lawyers seems tied to an attempt that has long been
made-often unsuccessfully-to distinguish the practice of law from the
carrying on of a business.62 The rhetoric suggests that while a business is carried
on purely for a profit motive, the practice of law involves something above and
beyond concern for the bottom line. 63 This distinction is not easily justifiable
given the nature of the practice of law in contemporary times. There exists a
dichotomy between professional ideology and self-portrayal as a non-business
and the reality that a law firm, particularly a large law firm, is a business. 64 Given
the growth of the big law firm in recent decades, it seems that such firms are not
significantly different from investment banks or consulting firms in terms of
organizational structure and how they are run. Profit-maximization is a central
goal, despite images to the contrary that are presented and promulgated by big
59. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN P. PALMrrER, CORPORATIONS 70 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that limited
liability exists because it facilitates public stock trading markets).
60. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 56, at 40-62.
61. Cf Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the reach of liability differs as
among shareholders, officers, and directors in different contexts).
62. See generally Richard Abel, The Decline of Professionalism, 49 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1986); Robert Gordon,
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. I (1988); Deborah Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 283 (1998).
63. See Rhode, supra note 62, at 298.
64. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 48, at 12; ROBERT L. NELSON ET AL., LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Cornell University Press 1992).
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law firms in the public sphere.65 Why else would the American Lawyer annually
publish a list of the top one hundred law firms in the United States by revenues,
profits per partner, and other measures of monetary well-being? 66 As well, given
the type of work done by corporate lawyers in large firms, it seems that much of
their practice is no more closely related to the values of the justice system than
the work of a corporate lawyer's close substitutes, the investment banker or
management consultant. Moreover, many of the services performed by corporate
law firms are non-legal and non-advisory in nature and could be performed by
non-lawyers.67
If the practical distinction between a profession and a business cannot be
justified, then it seems that there is little reason to the rule prohibiting lawyers
from practicing using a corporate form or from forming LLPs. The rise of limited
liability in the law firm may be recognition that law practice is a business and is
exposed to the risks of liability not unlike other businesses; as a result, it is simply
unfair that law firms are not treated like other businesses.
However, the fairness argument also cuts the other way. If the distinction
between law and business cannot be justified, it seems then we need to
re-examine and re-evaluate whether lawyers ought to be afforded the privileges
(i.e., prestige, self-regulation, etc.) associated with being members of a profes-
sion.
The fact that legislatures were unwilling to create a wholesale limitation of
liability for lawyers by allowing them to incorporate or by creating LLPs that
provided a fuller shield from personal liability, and instead found a middle
ground by creating some protection from personal liability under the LLP form of
business association may have been the legislature's validation of some of the
arguments that have historically distinguished the practice of law from other
productive profit-seeking activities. Or instead, perhaps the self-regulatory
organizations for lawyers simply were not confident that they could successfully
make the more difficult case for allowing lawyers to practice using corporations.
65. For example, on its website, the New York based law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
emphasizes its "commitment to public service" and highlights its involvement in a "wide variety of charitable
endeavors." See http://www.skadden.consitePage.ihtml?URL=communitylnvolvement.ihtml (last visited
Sept. 26, 2001). The firm also publicizes the Skadden Fellowship Foundation, "which annually provides
two-year fellowships to at least 25 very talented young lawyers so that they may pursue the practice of public
interest law on a full-time basis." See http://www.skadden.com/sitePage.ihtrnl?URL=communityFellowship.ihurm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2001).
66. Robert Gordon, Can Lawyers' Professional Values Be Saved? Are They Worth Saving?, (Preliminary
Draft of Lecture Given at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, September 23, 1999, on file with author).
67. See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Lawyers Taking Stock as Legal Fees, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2001)
[hereinafter Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock]; Poonam Puri, Financing Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A
Share of Justice, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515, 522 (1998); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills andAsset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 295 (1984).
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B. EFFECT OF LLPS ON THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS WITHIN THE LAW FIRM
1. INCREASED RISK OF NEGLIGENT WORK
An argument against limited liability in the law firm is that it may encourage
excessive risk-taking by partners. In the context of LLPs, the argument is that
partners in law firms organized as LLPs will take less care in performing their
work. However, this argument is negated by the fact that a partner in an LLP law
firm is shielded only from the negligence of co-partners; 68 he or she remains
personally liable for his or her own negligence and the negligence of anyone
under his or her direct supervision or control. 69 Thus, partners will continue to
have the proper incentives to take care when performing their own work and to
effectively supervise associates under their direct supervision or control.
2. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY CHILL
Will partners in law firms organized as LLPs be chilled from taking on
management and supervisory roles because doing so may expose them to a
greater risk of personal liability? For example, a junior partner and two associates
work on a initial public offering for a client; the client sues on the basis that the
associate was negligent in performing legal work; will the partners on the opinion
review committee who reviewed the opinion drafted by the associate be
personally liable if the client sues for negligence? Will the partners on the firm
hiring committee who hired the associate be personally liable? Will the partners
on the firm's management committee that is responsible for setting firm policies
and procedures be personally liable? Will the possibility of liability result in an ex
ante chill on accepting management positions within the law firm? Responses to
these questions will depend upon the interpretation of the phrase "direct
supervision and control ' 70 for which there is generally no legislative definition
and very little judicial guidance.71 It is unlikely, however, that a broad
interpretation of "direct supervision and control" will create incentives for
partners to avoid supervisory or senior management positions within the law firm
because the benefits that arise from their enhanced reputation will likely
outweigh liability concerns.
3. PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND THE EFFECT ON DRAws
The conversion by a law firm from a general partnership to an LLP will likely
affect the internal dynamics in relation to partners' draws. The issue of personal
68. See Partnership Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990) (Ont.), as amended by S.O., ch. 2, §10(2) (1998) (Ont.).
69. See id. at § 10(3) (1998) (Ont.).
70. Partnership Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990) (Ont.), as amended by S.O., ch. 2, §10(3) (1998) (Ont.).
7 1. A search on Westlaw in the CAN-ALLCASES database using the phrase "direct supervision and control"
came up with less than 20 cases. Thus, there is very little judicial guidance and none of it is particularly relevant,
helpful or interesting.
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liability of partners only arises after partnership assets and liability insurance
have been exhausted.72 A key partnership asset in most law firms is the monies
received from clients for services rendered. Since law firms are not capital
intensive and thus do not need to retain their profits for reinvestment, profits are
generally drawn by the partners on a regular basis. In the face of an on-going
negligence lawsuit, negligent partners will have an incentive to retain as much of
the profits in the firm while non-negligent or innocent partners will have an
incentive to draw as much as possible from the firm. Unlike in the general
partnership context where liability rules encourage partners to "sink or swim
together," partners in law firms organized as LLPs have divergent incentives
based on their differing liability status.
4. ABANDONING TEAMWORK AND COLLEGIALITY FOR INDIVIDUALISM
Law firms have traditionally prided themselves on teamwork and collegial-
ity.73 However, it seems that recent changes in law firms' structure and
organization, ranging from compensation trends to legal forms of organization,
result in a move away from the collective and toward the individual.74 While
lockstep compensation systems were at one time the norm in compensation for
partners at law firms, compensation tied to performance based on the "eat what
you kill" philosophy is a much more apt description of compensation norms and
trends at most North American law firms today.75 Similarly, the conversion of law
firms to LLPs suggests that even partners practicing at large law firms are very
similar to sole-practitioners in terms of their liability status, again reflecting a
triumph of the individual over the collective.76 In fact, the two trends may be
related. As a general matter, it appears that firms that have converted to LLPs also
have compensation systems that are tied to performance while firms that remain
general partnerships also compensate their partners on the basis of a lock-step
system.77
72. See infra Part III.C.3.
73. McMillan Binch's website advertises that the firm continues to build a "collaborative work environment
by providing opportunities for growth through delegation, sharing information and experience, relying on each
other's expertise, keeping commitments and trusting each other." See http://www.mcbinch.com/About/
core-values/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2001). Similarly, Sullivan & Cromwell's website states that the firm
places an "emphasis on teamwork which allows [them] to utilize all of the resources of the firm." See
http://www.sullcrom.com/display.asp?section-id =5 (last visited Sept. 26, 2001).
74. On compensation trends, see Ronald J. Gilson & R.H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists:
An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313,
313-40 (1985).
75. Id.
76. See generally id. at 333.
77. See generally Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR- L. REv. 15, 41-42 (1994).
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF LLPS FOR CONSUMERS AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES
1. TRANSFER OF RISK OF LOSS TO CONSUMERS OF LEGAL SERVICES
Limited liability allows the owners of an enterprise to avoid bearing the risk of
loss if the enterprise is unable to pay its liabilities.78 But, the risk of loss does not
disappear. It is transferred to those who deal with the enterprise.79 Customers,
lenders, suppliers, employees, and tort victims must bear that risk.
One line of economic analysis argues that the issue of limited versus unlimited
liability is overstated, if not irrelevant. 80 A change from a rule of unlimited
liability to limited liability is a zero sum game. 81 The benefits of limited liability
to corporate shareholders are exactly offset by the detriment to creditors of the
corporation.8 The benefit to shareholders in terms of a reduction in risk is offset
by the increase in the cost of capital that will be demanded by creditors to
compensate them for bearing additional risk. Thus, the firm's cost of capital is the
same under both liability regimes.
A second line of analysis suggests that limited liability is not a zero sum game
but leads to efficient outcomes. The theory is that creditors are better bearers of
risk than shareholders because they have relatively lower monitoring, informa-
tion, and co-ordination costs relative to shareholders.83
A third line of analysis suggests that limited liability is inefficient because
certain creditors are unable to protect themselves. They are unable to adjust their
cost of capital to reflect the additional risk they bear.84
In analyzing the efficiency of limited liability, the law and economics literature
sub-divides creditors into voluntary and involuntary creditors. It is generally
settled among law and economics scholars that limited liability is efficient in
relation to voluntary creditors because they can protect themselves.85 They have
the ability to negotiate the terms of credit and engage in monitoring. Easterbrook
and Fischel write: "Employees, consumers, trade creditors, and lenders are
voluntary creditors. The compensation they demand will be a function of the risk
they face."8 6
In contrast, law and economics scholars have been vigorously debating the
normative wisdom of limited liability in the context of involuntary creditors.
78. See EASTER3ROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 56, at 40-62.
79. See id.
80. See Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 351 (1979).
81. See id.
82. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
89,98 (1985).
83. See id. at 98-101.
84. See EASTERBROOK & FiscHEL, supra note 56, at 56, 58; Halpern et al., supra note 44, at 117.
85. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 56, at 57; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Towards
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1565 (1991); Halpern et al., supra note 44, at 118.
86. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 56.
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Hansmann and Kraakman, 87 and Leebron88 make a strong case for unlimited
shareholder liability for torts committed by the corporation. The literature
suggests that limited liability may not be efficient in the context of involuntary
creditors such as tort victims because they do not have the opportunity to
negotiate the terms of credit and engage in effective monitoring of a corporation's
activities. s9
This Article concludes that a rule of limited liability in the context of legal
services may not be efficient. The law and economics literature regards
consumers as voluntary creditors and assumes that they have the knowledge and
bargaining power to make rational risk-return calculations. These assumptions
may be invalid in the context of consumers of legal services. Even if a case can be
made that a rule of limited liability is allocatively efficient, the distributional
effect of the rule is clear: limited liability results in an uncompensated transfer of
wealth from consumers of legal services to their lawyers.
The nature of legal services is such that there is an information asymmetry
between the provider and the consumer of legal services about the quantity,
quality and price of legal services. 90 Even after legal services have been
provided, a client is generally not in a position to assess whether he or she was
reasonably billed and whether the services were well-performed. 9'
As a general matter, it is difficult for any consumer of legal services to evaluate
the quality and cost of legal services. Nonetheless, consumers of legal services
can be placed along a spectrum with respect to sophistication in terms of their
ability to monitor quality and price. More sophisticated consumers may have
some ability to effectively monitor the quality and price of services being offered.
They may be repeat users of a particular legal service or law firm.92 Corporate
clients, particularly those with in-house counsel, would be included on this end of
the spectrum. 93 In contrast, unsophisticated consumers are those who cannot
effectively monitor the price and quality of legal services because they are
one-shot or infrequent users of legal services.
Liability of partners in a law firm only becomes relevant when a plaintiff's
judgment exceeds the sum of any insurance coverage taken out by the law firm
and the value of the partnership's assets. It is only after these assets have been
87. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 85.
88. See Leebron, supra note 85.
89. See Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability, supra note 18.
90. This information asymmetry provides a justification for the regulation of the professions. See generally
Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, J. POL. EcON. 1328
(1979); Avner Shaked & John Sutton, The Self-Regulating Profession, 48 REV. ECON. STu. 217 (1981).
91. See Pur, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, supra note 67, at 128; Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How
the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REv. 953 (2000).
92. See Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, supra note 67, at 128; Hadfield, supra note 91.
93. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging From the Expanding
Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. "rx. L. REv. 497,499 (1998).
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exhausted that a plaintiff may seek to recover against the personal assets of
partners.
Under liability rules for firms organized as general partnerships, all partners,
including all non-negligent partners, are personally liable to a plaintiff.94 Under
liability rules for firms organized as LLPs, the partner who performed the
negligent work remains personally liable to the consumer of legal services,
similar to the liability rule for general partnerships. 95 However, the non-negligent
partners in the firm are not personally liable to the plaintiff and their assets are not
available for recovery by the plaintiff.96 Thus, LLPs result in consumers of legal
services bearing a greater risk of loss if legal work is negligent and if their law
firm's liability insurance and partnership assets are insufficient to cover the loss.
Given the change in liability rules, one should find that in a competitive
market, the hourly billing rates of partners and associates at law firms that have
converted to LLPs should have (automatically) decreased commensurate with the
decrease in risk-bearing by the law firm. Anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise;
law firms that have converted to LLPs have not adjusted their hourly billing rates
downward to reflect the reduced risk they bear.
Given that law firms that have converted to LLPs have not automatically
reduced their billing rates, savvy consumers of legal services have two choices ex
ante. First, they can negotiate a reduction in the price of the services because they
face a greater risk of loss in the event that the services performed are negligent.
Alternatively, they can contract around the default limited liability rule and
demand that the other partners in the firm sign guarantees that they will be
personally liable in the event that the partner performing the work is negligent.
It is unlikely that unsophisticated consumers will be able to effect the results
envisioned by the economic model outlined above. Unsophisticated consumers
may not have the knowledge to even consider engaging in any negotiation with
their legal service provider. While LLP legislation generally requires the letters
"LLP" to be included after the firm name, this is the only form of notice mandated
by the Ontario legislation.97 It is doubtful that unsophisticated consumers will be
aware of or understand the changes in liability rules that result from these three
additional letters after a firm name. If this is correct, then unsophisticated
consumers will not even consider discussing the issue of liability with their
lawyer.
Even assuming that an unsophisticated consumer recognizes the meaning of
the letters "LLP" and raises the issue with his or her lawyer, it is unlikely that the
94. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Detlev F. Vagts, Basic Corporation Law Ch.2 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
95. See Meiners et al., supra note 80.
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 39-41. The self-regulatory bodies for lawyers in some jurisdictions require the law firm
to notify existing clients. See, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada Bylaw 26 § 2.
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potential client will have the bargaining power to negotiate a lower price or get
the other partners in the law firm to sign personal guarantees. Since the
unsophisticated consumer is only a one-shot or infrequent user of legal services,
the lawyer loses very little by playing hardball.
It is true that the legal services required by unsophisticated consumers will be
of a more routine nature and will involve smaller amounts of money. As a result,
it would seem that any potential negligence claim by an unsophisticated
consumer would generally be covered by the law firm's insurance. However, it is
possible that an aggregate of claims by unsophisticated consumers of legal
services, in the context of a class action, for example, would exceed the firm's
insurance coverage and partnership assets. In these cases, the issue of limited
versus unlimited liability for the firm's non-negligent partners would be very
important.
In comparison, sophisticated consumers of legal services may have the
requisite knowledge to recognize the change in liability that results from the use
of the letters "LLP" after a law firm's name.9 8 After recognizing this change,
sophisticated consumers may also have greater bargaining power to obtain a
reduction in price or obtain personal guarantees from the other partners in the
firm because a law firm is more likely to negotiate and compromise with its
sophisticated consumers if they provide large or steady streams of income.
However, even sophisticated consumers may not have sufficient bargaining
power to convince a law firm to reduce its price. 99
2. NOT ALL CONSUMERS ARE CLIENTS AND NOT ALL CLAIMS ARE BASED IN NEGLIGENCE
It is important to note that the first wave of LLP legislation disproportionately
impacts consumers of legal services who are not clients. Clients may be able to
pursue simultaneous causes of action in negligence and contract for harm caused
to them by faulty legal work. For a claim based in negligence, the LLP shield will
only allow a client to recover from the negligent partner(s). However, a client can
recover from the personal assets of all the partners in the law firm for a claim
based on a breach of contract theory. Thus, LLP status does not necessarily have a
practical impact on the ability of clients to recover from the personal assets of
partners. In fact, it creates incentives for clients to frame causes of action in
contract rather than negligence.
However, many individuals or entities that consume a law firm's legal services
are not "clients" in a legal sense. They may use and rely on a law firm's work
98. Id.
99. However, even they may have little or no bargaining power to refuse to sign a blanket prospective waiver
of future conflict of interest when retaining some elite U.S. law firms. See Lawrence Fox, Dan's World: A Free
Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 Bus. LAW. 1533 (2000). Elsewhere, I have suggested that large,
elite corporate law firms have market power in demanding equity in their clients. See Pur, Taking Stock of
Lawyers Taking Stock as Legal Fees, supra note 67.
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product, but may not have entered into a contractual relationship with it.
Unsophisticated retail investors and sophisticated institutional investors who, in
making investment decisions, rely on the contents of a prospectus prepared by
legal counsel for the issuer are not clients of the law firm and would not be able to
sue on the basis of a breach of contract claim.100 As a result, their recourse would
be limited to an action in negligence, and if successful, they would only be able to
recover against the negligent partners in an LLP firm.
On the other hand, claims involving sexual harassment, libel, slander, or torts
other than negligence are not covered by the LLP shield in first wave LLP
statutes. Thus, all partners remain personally liable in situations involving, for
example, breach of a lease, employee discrimination and sexual harassment. The
policy rationale for limiting liability only with respect to negligence claims may
be a response to the recent judicial expansion of duties owed to third parties in
tort.
o10
3. THE ROLE OF (MANDATORY) INSURANCE
Most jurisdictions in the United States that allow for the formation of LLPs do
not require that law firms maintain minimum levels of liability insurance
coverage. Ontario's LLP legislation requires that firms wishing to practice as
LLPs must carry liability insurance, but allows the relevant self-governing body
for the professional group to establish the minimum level.' 0 2 The Law Society
has established the mandatory minimum liability insurance coverage for firms
established as LLPs at one million dollars for each member of the firm.t°3 This
is the same minimum mandated for any lawyer practicing in Ontario as a
sole-practitioner or as a member of a general partnership. t' It is surprising that
the minimum mandated level is no higher than the amount required to practice
using a general partnership particularly given that consumers bear greater risk of
loss when a firm is organized as an LLP.
Mandatory insurance alleviates many of the concerns associated with practice
of law using LLPs. 10 5 It will only be a rare case where a liability claim exceeds
partnership assets and liability insurance. 10 6 As well, many large firms carry
100. See Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [19971 2 S.C.R. 165, 182-85 (Can.).
101. But in Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (Can.), the Supreme Court of
Canada limits the expansion of duties owed to third parties under tort law.
102. See Partnerships Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990), amended by S.O., ch. 2, §44.2(b) (1998) (Ont.).
103. Law Society of Upper Canada Bylaw 26 § 1.
104. Id.
105. Kevin Davis, Limited Liability Partnerships and the Economics of Mandatory Insurance, 32 CAN. Bus.
L.J. 51 (2000) See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative
Analysis of Economic Institutions 4 CoNrN. INs. L.J. 305 (1997); Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and
Limited Liability Entities: An Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TFx. L. REv. 641
(1998).
106. See Hanna, supra note 105, at 644.
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much more than the minimum mandated insurance.' 0 7 In jurisdictions where
there is no minimum mandatory insurance or in circumstances where law firms
are carrying more than the minimum mandated level of insurance, a law firm may
engage in strategic behavior after converting to an LLP. After converting to an
LLP, a law firm may then strategically reduce its existing level of insurance
coverage, knowing that non-negligent partners will not be liable for any amount
owing beyond insurance coverage and the partnership assets. An argument could
be made that the level of insurance coverage will not be reduced ex ante because
all partners are behind a veil of ignorance when making a decision about the
appropriate level of insurance coverage; they do not know who will and who will
not be negligent. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that
partners, when making decisions about insurance coverage, know that they
engage in practice areas that involve different levels of risks.'0 8 Those partners
who practice in areas involving an above-average risk of loss will wish to
maintain or increase existing levels of insurance coverage while those partners
who practice in areas involving below-average risks will wish to decrease
insurance coverage.
4. PIERCING THE LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP VEIL
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been created by the judiciary to
overcome some of the unfairness and/or inefficiencies that may arise from a strict
application of the rule of limited liability for shareholders of a corporation.1 09 For
example, courts have disregarded the corporate entity and imposed personal
liability on shareholders in cases of non-compliance with statutory formalities
and where representations of unlimited liability have been made. 10 Courts are
also more likely to pierce the corporate veil when dealing with closely-held
corporations as opposed to widely-held corporations.. and in circumstances
involving tort rather than contract creditors.' 12
107. Id.
108. For example, in Ontario, real estate lawyers historically have been subject to higher risk of claims,
although recently, more claims are being brought against litigation lawyers. See ANNUAL REPORT, Lawyers
Professional Indemnity Company (1999) on its website, www.lpic.ca/annual-reports/1999/claims (last visited
April 17, 2001.)
109. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036
(1991) [hereinafter Thompson, Empirical Study]; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate
Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT. L. 379 (1999) [hereinafter Thompson,
Shareholders as Investors].
110. Cf. C M Corp. v. Oberer Dev. Co., 631 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1980) (observing that "one of the primary
purposes of the corporate form of business is to insulate shareholders from unlimited liability, and that the
power to pierce the corporate veil should be exercised reluctantly and cautiously.").
111. See Thompson, Empirical Study, supra note 109, at 1041; Thompson, Shareholders as Investors, supra
note 109, at 387.
112. See Thompson, Empirical Study, supra note 109, at 1042; Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability
in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1997).
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It is likely that the judiciary will extend the doctrine of veil piercing to firms
that are organized as LLPs. 1 3 Certainly, a firm that does not comply with notice
requirements mandated by LLP legislation or the self-regulatory body for
lawyers, such as including the letters "LLP" after its name or sending a letter
advising existing clients of a change in liability rules, exposes its partners to
the risk that a court will pierce the LLP veil and impose personal liability on
non-negligent partners. Drawing both on the fact that courts are more likely to
pierce the corporate veil in the context of closely-held corporations and the
economic theory that it may be efficient to pierce the corporate veil in
closely-held corporations, one can speculate that smaller law firms, (those with
fewer partners), which are organized as LLPs are at higher risk of veil piercing by
the judiciary than larger firms which have more partners. On this basis, it is not
unreasonable to make the claim that the benefits of LLP legislation may accrue
disproportionately to partners practicing in large law firms, thereby further
separating the two hemispheres of lawyers.
11 4
IV. THE CAMPAIGN FOR LLPs IN ONTARIO
Part IV analyzes the legislative process through which LLP statutes were
enacted. An analysis of the legislative process and debates leading up to the
implementation of LLPs in Ontario reveals three insights. First, professional
interest groups used rhetoric and imagery about prevailing notions of individual
blame over collective responsibility rather than reasoned arguments to convince
the legislators to statutorily authorize LLPs. Second, professional interest groups
were careful to present LLPs as a necessity for their entire profession, rather than
factions of their profession. Finally, the particular structure of the legislation in
Ontario suggests that only well-organized, financially strong professional groups
will be able to wield their political power to have LLP legislation implemented in
their favor.
A. HOW LLP LEGISLATION CAME INTO EFFECT IN ONTARIO
In the summer of 1998, the Partnership Act in Ontario was amended to allow
for the formation of LLPs.11 5 The legislation was passed with almost no public
debate. Only four months intervened between first and third reading of the bill. In
fact, the first and second readings of the bill took place on the same day, a rare
occurrence. Representatives from the relevant professional self-regulatory bodies
113. On veil piercing with respect to limited liability corporations, see Eric Fox, Piercing the Veil of Limited
Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143 (1994); John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine
of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for
Waiving Owners'Limited Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147 (2000).
114. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 10 for more on hemispheres of lawyers.
115. Partnerships Act, R.S.O., ch. P-5 (1990), amended by S.O., ch. 2 § 1 (1998) (Ont.).
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made submissions. No individual or organization spoke on behalf of consumers
of professional services. All three major political parties were in favor of the
legislation, and there was no opposition to the bill. 1
16
1. RHETORIC AND IMAGERY RATHER THAN REASON
Representatives from the chartered accountancy profession (C.A.s) made
submissions to the Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice. Rather
than presenting reasoned arguments and analysis about the public and private
benefits and costs of limited liability, they instead used imagery and rhetoric of
the prevailing ideology of individual responsibility. They also attempted to
project themselves as ordinary people with the kind of real problems faced by
other citizens of Canada. For example, a C.A. partner from the Kitchener-
Waterloo office of a national firm pleaded:
I have no problem taking responsibility for my actions or my failure to act
properly in conducting my work as an auditor, but ... should I be responsible
for the actions of each of my partners?... [s]hould my personal assets ... be at
risk?
Like many of you, I've worked very hard over my lifetime and I feel I work
very hard every week. My wife doesn't work outside the home. In two years my
son will be off to university and also wants to become a chartered accountant.
Three years from now my daughter will be attending university. I am the
primary support provider in our household.
Unfortunately, any large lawsuit where I was sued and my personal assets were
at risk could cause significant hardship for my family. Would my children be
able to attend university? I don't know. I could get to retirement at age 60 or 65
and have my net worth wiped out under the present situation where my
personal assets are exposed as a result of a lawsuit, and this could happen even
though I was not part of the engagement team. 117
Despite the fact that the nuclear family is no longer the norm in Canada,' 18 that
116. This process (or lack thereof) is not dissimilar to the rapid pace at which LLP legislation was enacted in
the United States without much public policy debate. See Hamilton, supra note 26.
117. Proposed Partnerships Statute LawAmendmentAct 1998: Hearings Before the Standing Committee on
the Administration of Justice, Ontario Legislative Assembly (May 12, 1998), available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/
french/hansard/committee-debates/36_parl/session2/justice/j002.htm.
118. See Anne M. Milan, One Hundred Years of Families, 56 CANADIAN SOC. TRENDS 2 (2000) (documenting
the trend away from the traditional nuclear family in the 20th century towards a more flexible definition of the
family unit. "The last decades of the 20th century have brought greater individualism and more choice, giving
rise to new living arrangements. This pattern of both change and continuity is likely to be a defining
characteristic of families in the 21st century."); Susanne Kelman, Redefining Family: History of Canadian
Families 1900-2000, 80 BEAVER 44 (Feb./Mar. 2000) (whereby the author attributes the following changes in
family structure to the world wars, economic changes and conditions and to the birth-control pill: "Today,
Canadians seem reluctant to enter into marriage and parenthood at all. The marriage rate is down; fertility has
plummeted. Almost a quarter of adults in this country live alone. Almost 40 percent of marriages end in divorce.
2001]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
in many cases it is a luxury for one partner in a marriage to stay at home, 9 that
there is government assistance for higher education,' 20 that most citizens of
Canada do not have sufficient income to save for retirement,12 ' the politicians
were persuaded by these pleas. As one politician stated:
If this bill isn't put into place, what happens is that one of the partners who isn't
directly involved with the service being provided could possibly lose his or her
home, car, cottage and personal assets. This is frightening to anybody,
considering what can happen in a litigated matter before the courts. By the time
you get through the court proceedings a year or two later, you lose your home,
your boat, your car and the shirt off your back even if you win. [Emphasis
added.] 122
Single parents and common-law marriages no longer raise eyebrows."); YvES PERON, CANADIAN FAMILIES AT
THE APPROACH OF THE YEaR 2000 (1999) (presenting an analysis examining over 30 years in the evolution of the
structure and composition of Canadian and family households and living arrangements); Nicholas Bala, The
Evolving Canadian Definition of the Family: Towards a Pluralistic and Functional Approach, 8 INT'L J.L. &
FAM. 292, 312 (1994) ("[I]t is clear that the law has moved far from its traditional, morally based approach,
where the family was considered only to be husband and wife, and any children they might have."); see
generally MARGRIT EICHLER, FAMILY SHIFTS: FAMILIES, POLICIES AND GENDER EQUALITY (1997).
119. See generally EICHLER, supra note 118; Behind the imes: Families Have Reinvented Themselves
During the Last Three Decades, But Many of the Government Programs Aimed At Supporting Families Have
Not, CAN. & WORLD BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 1997, at 28-31 (documenting the rise in two income families and the
difficulties associated therewith); Sandra Cordon, Family Incomes Falling Despite Job Growth, Working More,
CANADIAN PRESS NEWSWIRE, Apr. 14, 1999, at 1 (indicating that the number of two-income households has
skyrocketed from 30 per cent of Canadian families 30 years ago, to 70 percent today).
120. See David B. Perry, Education Financing in Canada: An Update, 43 CANADIAN TAX J. 222 (1995)
(showing the distribution of spending between the provincial and local levels of government for post-secondary
education); Maureen Donnelly et al., Registered Education Savings Plans: A Tax Incentive Response to Higher
Education Access, 47 CANADIAN TAX J. 81 (1998) (discussing RESPs as a vehicle for paying the future costs of
higher education with tax sheltered dollars); Human Resources Development Canada, at http://www.hrdc.gc.ca/
commonnews/hrib/99-44.shtml (explaining the federal and the Ontario government's collaborative approach to
financial assistance for postsecondary education including interest relief provisions. The site also stresses the
importance of postsecondary education for the future of Canada and the government's dedication to this goal:
"The Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) is the largest single program in any country, providing over $15
billion of financial assistance for over 2.7 million students since its inception in 1964."). See generally Ross
FoNNIE et al., STUDENT LOANS IN CANADA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1996).
121. See Cordon, supra note 121 (citing figures released by Statistics Canada that indicate "[f]amilies are
working longer and harder, yet finding it increasingly difficult to get ahead ... the standard of living of
Canadians has fallen in the '90s, so we're no better off than we were 20 years ago"), Tracy LeMay, Canadian
Family Needs a Break: Incomes, Savings Falling as Spending, Debt Increases, NAT'L POST, Jan. 19, 2000, at D4
(citing a study from the Vanier Institute of the Family that suggests the income drop experienced by families is
the result of low average weekly wages, declining government transfers such as employment insurance, taxes
and unemployment levels. The article also documents the difficulty Canadians are experiencing in saving for
retirement); Heart of the Matter: What is the Canadian Psyche Thinking About Retirement?, BENEFITS CANADA,
Oct. 1996, at 33-35 (suggesting that while Canadians are struggling to keep financially afloat, they are left with
little time or money to think about and act on their retirement needs. The article also indicates that "nearly 70%
of Canadians contributing to a pension plan don't believe they'll have enough to retire on based on their
employer plan.").
122. Proposed Partnerships Statute Law Amendment Act 1998: Hearings Before the Standing Committee
on the Administration of Justice, Ontario Legislative Assembly (May 6, 1998), available at http://
hansardindex.ontia.on.ca/hansardeissue/36-2/100 8 b.htm (statement of Mr. Mike Colle).
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An analysis of the submissions and responses above suggests that the
prevailing ideology of individual blame over collective responsibility was central
in the minds of both the professionals and the legislators.
2. "THIS IS NOT JUST A BIG FIRM, BIG CITY PHENOMENON" - PRESENTING A UNITED
PROFESSIONAL FRONT
The self-regulatory bodies for the relevant professional groups were careful to
present the image that LLPs were necessary for the entire profession, rather than
predominately for the benefit of big firms. 123 David Wilson, the CEO of the
Ontario Institute for Chartered Accountants, stated before the Standing Commit-
tee on Justice: "The act protects the 3,395 C.A.s who are partners in Ontario C.A.
firms. It provides the same protection to partners in the 576 offices of local firms
as those in the 194 offices of regional firms and those in the 64 offices of the
so-called Big Six national firms." 124 As well, it seems that the three chartered
accountants who made submissions before the Standing Committee on Justice
were carefully selected to ensure representation of the profession: a partner from
the Belleville office of a regional firm in eastern Ontario, a partner from the Sault
Ste. Marie office of a firm with fifty-seven offices in Ontario, and a partner from
the Kitchener-Waterloo office of a national firm that has fourteen offices in
Ontario. Conspicuously absent was a partner from the Toronto office of a
multi-national firm for whom the legislation is likely to be most valuable.
3. PROFESSIONAL POWER DETERMINES WHO DOES (AND DOESN'T) GET ACCESS
TO THE LLP FORM OF BusiNEss ASSOCIATION
The Ontario legislation requires each professional association to approach the
legislature to have their governing act amended so as to allow for their members
123. See Robert MacCrate, A Nation Under Lost Lawyers: The Legal Profession at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, 100 DICK. L. REv. 587 (1996) (MacCrate suggests that the unitary concept of what it means to be a
lawyer is a difficult one to maintain as a result of the very different practice settings and the different types of
work in which lawyers are engaged and also documents the historical development of a unified identity for the
legal profession); David B. Wilkins, Special Issue Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers:
Afterword: How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers? - Managing Conflict and Context in
Professional Regulation, 65 FoRD. L. REv. 465 (1996) (indicating that "the traditional claim that a uniform set
of ethical rules and enforcement practices governs all lawyers in all context is both descriptively false and
normatively unattractive"); Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and
the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 9 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism
Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229 (1995). For a response to Pearce, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The
Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for Conceptualization and Regulating the Legal Professions, 27 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 25 (1999) (documenting the dangers of rejecting professionalism). See also Bryant G. Garth,
Independent Professional Power and the Search for a Legal Ideology with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183
(1987); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1992).
124. Proposed Partnerships Statute Law Amendment Act 1998: Hearings Before the Standing Committee
on the Administration of Justice, Ontario Legislative Assembly (May 6, 1998), available at http://
hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/36-2/1008b.htm.
20011
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
to form LLPs. This regime does not appear to be very efficient, especially since
there is limited space on the political agenda. It suggests that only relatively powerful
professional groups will gain access to this new form of business association.
The chartered accounting profession was, in the summer of 1998, the first to
have its legislation amended so as to allow for C.A. firms to form LLPs. At that
time, the Minister for Consumer and Commercial Relations, the Honourable
David H. Tsubouchi stated:
This government is taking a careful, measured approach to LLPs. For that
reason, only chartered accountant firms may practice as limited liability
partnerships for the time being. However, we will consider limited liability
partnerships for other professions if their governing bodies can demonstrate a
need for this type of organizational structure related to their work while at the
same time protecting the interests of the Ontario consumer.
25
He added, "In the future, presumably these other professional organizations,
whether it be the veterinarians, ... the law society or the various health
professions, could propose similar legislation as is being put forward by the
Chartered Accountants." 126 In December 1998, the Law Society Act was amended
to allow law firms to form LLPs.1 2  The amendments allowing for the formation
of LLPs were buried under a number of other significant amendments to the Law
Society Act. 1 2 8 No discussion or debate took place in the legislature on the
formation of LLPs for lawyers.
The Certified General Accountants, another professional group of accountants,
also lobbied vigorously for an amendment to their governing legislation so as to
allow their members to form LLPs. Ralph Palumbo, a senior member of the
Certified General Accountants Association, of Ontario pleaded before the
Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice: 
1 2 9
125. Proposed Partnerships Statute Law Amendment Act 1998: Hearings Before the Standing Committee
on the Administration of Justice, Ontario Legislative Assembly (May 6, 1998), available at http://
hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/36-2,008b.htm.
126. Id.
127. An Act to Amend the Law Society Act, S.O. ch. 21 (1998) (Ont.).
128. See supra note 127 The other amendments were as follows: First, the amendments increased the number
of public representatives on the law society's governing board. Second, the amendments improved the public
complaint system by providing for the appointment of a new complaints resolution commissioner. Third, the
amendments allow the law society to regulate not only the conduct of lawyers, but also the quality of services
provided by lawyers. Fourth, the amendments clarified the definition of "incapacity" and permit the law society
to issue remedial orders for treatment or counseling for lawyers suffering from a mental illness, alcohol or drug
abuse. Fifth, the reforms gave the law society the clear legislative mandate it needs to thoroughly investigate
complaints and require the cooperation of lawyers. Sixth, the law society has a range of new powers to protect
the public where lawyers are acting improperly. Finally, the amendments streamline law society hearings and
appeals and divert minor administrative infractions from the formal hearing process.
129. Proposed Partnerships Statute Law Amendment Act 1998: Hearings Before the Standing Committee on
the Administration of Justice, Ontario Legislative Assembly (May 12, 1998), at http://www.ontla.on.ca/french/
hansardlcommittee-debates/36parUsession2justicejOO2.htm.
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If certified general accountants in public practice are left out of Bill 6, how do
we go back to our members and explain that the provincial government had
decided that their competitors, the chartered accountants, are protected by the
legislation while they are not? How do we tell them that their personal assets
will continue to be subject to claims as a result of negligent acts of their
partners while their competitors have no such worries? How does the
government frankly defend that? All we're asking is that there be a level
playing field. Our members are in the marketplace. They offer their services
like other accountants and there's no good public policy reason to treat them
any differently.
Despite their pleas, the certified general accountants ("CGAs") were unsuccess-
ful in lobbying the government to allow them access to the LLP form of business
association. The relative differences in power and influence between chartered
accountants and lawyers on the one hand, and certified general accountants on the
other, provides a forceful explanation of why the former groups were granted
access to the legislation but the latter group was not.130 Certified general
accountants are less numerous, less influential and not as well organized as
chartered accountants and lawyers. 13 1 Additionally, certified general accountants
have been in a battle with the chartered accountants over professional jurisdiction
and territory. CGAs have for years unsuccessfully lobbied the Ontario govern-
ment to allow them to conduct some of the functions (e.g., public audits) that are
currently within the exclusive domain of chartered accountants. It is possible that
the politicians may have made a calculated decision to deny the LLP form to
CGAs so as to maximize their support from the CAs.
On the basis of the general theory of professional power advanced above, it is
not difficult to predict which of the remaining professional groups in Ontario-
medical doctors, dentists, veterinarians, real estate agents, hairstylists, and so
on-will be successful in lobbying for access to the LLP form of business
association in the future.
130. See John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REv. 891 (1983) (outlining various theories on
professionalism and suggesting that professionals such as lawyers have acquired influential social power on the
basis of their autonomy and specialized knowledge. What distinguishes occupations that achieve professional-
ism from those that do not is whether the individuals in such occupation can collect the resources necessary
to persuade others that they deserve such status); Kenneth J. Lipartio & Paul J. Miranti, Professions and
Organizations in the Twentieth Century America, 72 Soc. Scl. Q. 301 (June 1998) (suggesting that
professionals, such as lawyers, engineers, and accountants, remain autonomous and powerful as a result of the
close ties such professionals have forged with corporate organizations); see generally TERRENCE J. JOHNSON,
PROFESSIONS AND POWER (1972); Bryant G. Garth, Independent Professional Power and the Search for a Legal
Ideology with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183 (1987).
131. Ontario has 13,000 CGAs and 8,000 CGA students. See Certified General Accountants of Ontario's
website at http://www.cga-ontario.org/newfiles/media/profile/profile.htm (last visited April 18, 2001). Ontario
has 28,800 CAs and over 3,300 CA students. See The Institute for Chartered Accountants of Ontario's website at
http://www.icao.on.ca/public/about/overview.html (last visited April 18, 2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the gradual demise of liability in the law firm, and
concluded that the private benefits conferred upon lawyers by LLPs are at the
expense of consumers of legal services, particularly unsophisticated consumers.
The greater likelihood of judicial veil piercing in the context of smaller law firms
organized as LLPs means that the primary beneficiaries of LLPs will be partners
practicing at large firms, thereby further separating the two hemispheres of
lawyers. The advent of LLPs for lawyers also seems to be correlated with "eat
what you kill" compensation trends, reflecting a more general trend of the
commercialization of the legal profession. Given the strong political forces
behind the implementation of LLPs, it is unlikely that such legislation will be
repealed any time in the near future. Therefore, future analysis ought to focus on
the impact on and relationship of LLPs to other changes in the structure and
organization of law firms, and implications for what it means, or should mean, to
be members of a profession and to be afforded attendant privileges.
